Abstract
International maritime cooperation and competition have become the main theme of international politics in the 21st century; the center stage stretches from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. As the issues of the East and South China Seas continue to heat up, cooperative development through peace initiatives has become even more important. Accordingly, the ROC’s geopolitical and strategic value is ascending. The task of the Republic of China lies in encouraging the PRC to become a constructive member of the international community. President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative has great potential to make contributions to regional peace and stability.
The “three lines of defense” and the “three legs of national security”—the national security strategy of the Republic of China—support the strategic values of the ROC and are in line with America’s renewed Asian strategy. President Ma’s Peace Initiative and the principle of managing disputes would help build a foundation for negotiations for all claimants, deescalate regional tensions, fulfill the goal of peaceful resolution, and facilitate a multilateral international regime. They could be the best approaches to breaking the shackles of rival nationalisms and extricating claimants out of the so-called “security dilemma.” Actually, they have provided the missing link to overcome the barrier of sovereignty and contribute to regional peace and stability. It is sincerely hoped that resource sharing and joint development in the East China Sea will make Northeast Asia a model of international conflict management.
In the future, the Republic of China will continue to commit itself to the institutionalization of cross-Strait reconciliation by facilitating a virtuous cycle in bilateral relations, to the enhancement of its contribution to the international community by joining regional maritime non-traditional security cooperation and proposing cooperation in marine affairs, and to the alignment of its defense with diplomacy by consolidating its military strength to deter maritime traditional security threats.
Key words: maritime security cooperation; strategic symbiosis; East China Sea Peace Initiative; South China Sea
I. Introduction
The Asia-Pacific spans the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and includes many of the key engines of the global economy; therefore, “the future of geopolitics will be decided in Asia. … The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics.”[1] The economic growth rates of Asia as a whole have been among the highest in the world. To fuel their economic growth, regional countries depend more than ever on seaborne trade, which in essence refers to the free flow of trade and freedom of navigation. The issues regarding the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the Indian Ocean and western Pacific have become the focus of geopolitics.
Regional trends such as shared growing demand for energy, increasingly bustling shipping routes, and an emerging co-prosperity sphere depict a prospect of interconnectedness and interdependence. However, some negative trends are lurking in the region. Intensifying competing claims to maritime sovereignty and resources, struggle for chokepoints, and struggle for control of SLOCs, in the East and South China Seas, for example, could lead to clashes or even wars and bring imminent and critical danger to the survival and development of all countries involved; and increasing maritime non-traditional security threats could cause heavy impact upon the long-term sustainable development of regional economies. It is in the interests of all regional countries to jointly safeguard seaborne trade. Yet, competing claims have pushed these countries into a “security dilemma.”[2] That is, most of the regional countries are partners and rivals to one another at the same time, trapped in an uncomfortable embrace. Especially as the US revamps its Asian strategy in response to the rise of a seafaring PRC, the landscape of the international relations of the region is undergoing dramatic transformation. This paper aims to study the role and efforts of the Republic of China in advancing maritime security cooperation in the changing strategic environment as a result of America’s pivoting toward the Asia-Pacific. Specific research goals include:
1. Explore the theory and practice of maritime security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific;
2. Explore the general strategic posture in the context of America’s pivot toward the Asia-Pacific;
3. Explore the role, core values, and functionality of Taiwan in the changing strategic environment; and,
4. Explore the concrete policies, strategies, and approaches of Taiwan in promoting maritime security cooperation.
II. Concepts of & Requirements for Maritime Security Cooperation
A. General Theoretical Concepts on Maritime Security Threats
The concept of security can be divided into two categories: traditional and non-traditional. These categories also apply to maritime security. The primary concern of traditional security is external political coercion, economic exploitation and military invasion. Traditional security threats in the maritime domain mainly refer to competing claims to maritime sovereignty and resources, struggle for chokepoints, and struggle for control of sea lines of communication (SLOC). Here, the ocean itself is the physical target of conflicts. With the rise of globalization, the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, and the airspace above them—supports 90% of the world’s trade.[3] Freedom of the seas is critical to enhancing the velocity of global commerce; it is also a prerequisite for the economic development of any country. Yet, many maritime non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), piracy, avian flu, natural disasters, pollution, human trafficking, and transnational crime, may disrupt seaborne trade.[4] Here, the ocean is used as a path for the spread of natural and man-made disasters. The issues concerning maritime traditional and non-traditional security threats can be integrated as the paradigm below.
Figure 1: Categories of Maritime Security Threats
Source: integrated and produced by the author
Traditional security threats may bring imminent and critical danger to the survival and development of a country; by contrast, non-traditional security threats, if not dealt with in a timely manner, may bring about serious damage to national security and development, regional economies, and even the global trade order.[5] The major characteristics of non-traditional security threats include: firstly, it is often hard to identify the source of threat; secondly, such threats are often very elusive; thirdly, they often lack concrete targets for attack. The purpose of maritime security cooperation is to prevent or reduce, through collective efforts, the damage caused by traditional and non-traditional security threats alike. It takes the joint efforts of the regional or even international community to collaborate as a network to effectively protect what Mahan called “the great common” from becoming the physical target of conflicts or being used as a path for the spread of natural and man-made disasters.
B. Regional Practical Maritime Traditional/Non- Traditional Security Threats
(I) Maritime Traditional Security Threats
Maritime Traditional security threats are typical sources of confrontation and have been playing a leading role in shaping the regional political landscape. The competing claims in Asia, as shown in the table below, pose the greatest potential threats to peace and stability in the region.
Table 1: Competing Claims in Asia
Region Disputed Claims Claimants
Northeast Asia Northern Territories Japan, Russia
Takeshima or Dokdo Islands Japan, South Korea
East Asia East China Sea PRC, Japan, ROC
Diaoyutais or Senkaku Islands PRC, Japan, ROC
South China Sea Natuna Islands PRC, ROC, Indonesia
Paracel Islands PRC, ROC, Vietnam
Scarborough Shoal PRC, ROC, Philippines
Spratly Islands Brunei, PRC, Malaysia,
Philippines, ROC, Vietnam
Southeast Asia Camago and Malampaya gas fields PRC, ROC, Philippines
Gulf of Thailand Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam
Strait of Johore Malaysia, Singapore
Strait of Singapore Malaysia, Singapore
Palau Batu Putih Island Malaysia, Singapore
Sipadan; Sebtik; Ligitan Indonesia, Malaysia
Sabah and its neighboring waters Malaysia, Philippines
Source: integrated and produced by the author
Of all the competing claims, the most contentious issues revolve around the East China Sea and the South China Sea, where three and six claimant states are involved in sovereignty disputes respectively. Especially, the South China Sea plays an important role in commercial connection globally and regionally. It is the world’s second-busiest international sea lane. Some 50% of global merchant traffic passes through sea lanes in the South China Sea.[6] Nearly two-thirds of the tonnage passing through the Strait of Malacca, and half of the volume passing through the Spratly Islands, is crude oil from the Persian Gulf.[7] Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through the South China Sea shipping lanes, including 80% of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China.[8] The Pentagon argued that an increased People’s Liberation Army (PLA) presence in recent years could alter regional balances and disrupt the delicate status quo established by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).[9] The US National Bureau of Asian Research further argued that the increased PLA presence has rekindled an arms race and led to militarization of the South China Sea dispute.[10] In particular, the PRC’s inclusion of anti-SLOCs as one of the six offensive and defensive campaigns of the PLAN[11] invites non-claimant powers to join the South China Sea arena.
These competing claims, if not properly managed, could lead to clashes or even wars, disrupting sea lines of communication, bringing imminent and critical danger to the survival and development of all countries involved, and having serious impact upon regional peace and stability.
(II) Maritime Non-Traditional Security Threats
The emergence of almost all kinds of maritime non-traditional security threats, ranging from terrorism to transnational crime as enumerated in figure 1, brings about major turbulence in the Asia-Pacific maritime environment.[12] Given the close interconnectedness and interdependence of countries in the region, any such threats can easily produce spillover effect via the ocean. Take Pirates and natural disasters as examples.
Pirates: The Strait of Malacca, connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, is the shortest sea route between Persian Gulf suppliers and Asian markets. It is the key chokepoint with an estimated 13.6 million barrel per day (bbl/d) flow in 2009. The oil flow of the Strait of Malacca is well over seven times greater than that of the Suez Canal, and seventeen times greater than that of the Panama Canal (see table below).
Table 2: Oil Flows of the Seven Major Oil Chokepoints (2009)
oil flow (mil. bbl/d) global trade %
Strait of Hormuz 15.5 18.45%
Strait of Malacca 13.6 16.19%
Suez Canal 1.8 2.14%
Strait of Bab el-Mandeb 3.2 3.81%
Bosporus Straits 2.9 3.45%
Panama Canal 0.8 0.95%
Danish Straits 3.3 3.93%
Source: US Energy Information Agency[13]
The following table indicates that 25 years later, oil reserves in North America, the Asia Pacific, Europe and Eurasia could be depleted. Non-OECD Asia will then depend more on imported oil from the Middle East and Africa, further enhancing the oil flow through the Malacca Strait.
Table 3: Proved Reserves of Oil, 2010
Region Proved Reserves of Oil
Thousand million tons Share of Total Reserve/Production.
ratio
Middle East 101.8 54.4% 81.9
S. & C. Amer. 34.3 17.3% 93.9
Africa 17.4 9.5% 35.8
Eu. & Eurasia 19.0 10.1% 21.7
North Amer. 10.3 5.4% 14.8
Asia Pacific 6.0 3.3% 14.8
Total World 188.8 100.0% 46.2
Source: British Petroleum[14]
Virtually all shipping that passes through the Malacca and Sunda Straits must go through the South China Sea and pass near the Spratly Islands. The enormous value of goods (oil and non-oil alike) through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea has attracted pirate attacks on merchant shipping.[15]
Table 4: Trends of Piracy Incidents in Asia and Other Areas
Locations 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Indonesia 50 43 28 15 40
Malacca Strait 11 7 2 2 2
Malaysia 10 9 10 16 18
Myanmar 1 1
Philippines 6 6 7 1 5
Singapore Strait 5 3 6 9 3
Thailand 1 1 1 2
South China Sea 1 3 13 31
Vietnam 3 5 11 9 12
Bangladesh 47 15 12 17 23
India 5 11 10 12 5
Gulf of Aden 10 13 92 116 53
Red Sea 15 25
Somalia 10 31 19 80 139
Source: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report[16]
The table above shows trends of pirate attack incidents (including attempted attacks) that occurred in Asia and other areas in the past five years. In the Southeast Asia area (including Indonesia, the Malacca Strait, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, the Singapore Strait, and Thailand), the total number of piracy incidents was 70, 25 more than in 2009 (45). In the South China Sea, the total number was 31, 18 more than in 2009 (13). There were altogether 101 incidents in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea in 2010, second only to Somalia (139). Pirates have endangered the lives of seafarers and caused economic hardship for countries dependent on seaborne trade in the world.
Natural disasters: The UN-issued 2010 Asia Pacific Disaster Report indicates that “Asia-Pacific has been the region that suffered the largest number of disasters,” about 250 weather-related catastrophes per year.[17] Maplecroft’s Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2011 indicates that natural hazards have been more costly to the world economy in 2011 than any other year on record, and that the Unites States, Japan, PRC, and ROC are categorized as being at “extreme risk” for absolute economic exposure to natural hazards; however, the large emerging economies of Mexico, India, the Philippines, Turkey, and Indonesia are classified as ‘high risk’ countries and feature in the top 10.[18] According to the Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011, of all the continents on earth, Asia is the most vulnerable to natural calamities: 4 out of the top 5 countries most often hit are situated in Asia;[19] damages in Asia increased the most in 2011 compared to the 2001-2010 annual average;[20] Asia was most often hit by natural disasters (44.0%), accounted in 2011 for 86.3% of worldwide reported disaster victims, and suffered the most damage in 2011 (75.4% of worldwide natural disaster damage).[21]
Natural disasters such as drought, flood, landslide, mudslide, tropical storm and cyclone, earthquake, and sandstorm often hit the headlines around the world in recent years. As long as climate change worsens, human beings will be more vulnerable to weather-related disasters. Most of the victims of climate change may live on the land; however, its consequences will surely aggravate the burden of the international community in maritime security.
Pirates and natural disasters are just two kinds of the many maritime non-traditional security threats. There is likelihood that piracy may mix with transnational crime, smuggling of WMD, human trafficking, or even terrorism, and as a result compound the maritime security situation. Given the characteristics of such security threats, it is very hard for a country to deal with maritime non-traditional security threats alone. Any such security threats, if not addressed collaboratively, could have a heavy impact upon the long-term sustainable development of victim countries and have a serious impact upon regional prosperity.
III. Shaping of the Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region
A. Adjustment of the US Foreign Policy
Believing that the future of geopolitics lies in Asia, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton strongly advocated in America’s Pacific Century the following points:
1. Greater investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific is the core of the pivot of “America’s Pacific century” in the next decade;
2. America’s treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for the US strategic turn to the region;
3. America will participate in multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, and utilize “minilateral” meetings and “trilateral” opportunities such as engagement with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Mongolia, Indonesia and Kazakhstan to shape the regional security environment and advance US values.
4. America has been adamant about protecting its vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and will continue to ensure disputes are settled peacefully in accordance with the principles of international law.[22]
Clinton's recent visits to Asia have taken her to countries such as Indonesia, Burma, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Laos. In particular, her tours to Burma, Vietnam, and Laos－all once hostile cold war-era enemies－reflect Washington’s efforts in fulfilling the US foreign policy of pivoting toward the Asia-Pacific region.
B. Adjustment of US Defense Policy
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) already stipulated that the USN plans to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least 6 CVNs and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence,[23] clearly indicating a trend in re-orienting the center of gravity of its global military deployment toward the Asia-Pacific.
After Secretary of State Clinton’s assertion of US interests in the South China Sea, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said in January 2011 that the Pentagon was to consolidate its forward presence “along the Pacific Rim, particularly in Southeast Asia.”[24] US President Obama asserted in his remarks to the Australian Parliament in mid-November 2011 that “the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation. … The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.” [25] He then enumerated many countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, India, Cambodia, Burma and Vietnam as partners to work with at present and in the future.
On January 5, 2012, accompanied by US Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, President Obama announced the new US Defense Strategic Guidance, stressing to “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” and invest as required to ensure its ability to counter PRC’s A2/AD capabilities.[26] Accordingly, the United States consolidates its treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand and realigns these alliances toward the Asia-Pacific region.
C. General Strategic Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region
As tension was rising in the South China Sea, the US Navy launched “Pacific Partnership 2012” to visit Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia to provide medical, dental and other services to the people. Altogether, 16 countries participated in the largest-ever annual humanitarian and civic assistance mission in the Asia Pacific Region, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines,[27] all of which are locked in a territorial dispute with the PRC. Likewise, the “Rim of the Pacific 2012”－the largest ever in the RIMPAC series－attracted 22 countries to participate. “Pacific Partnership 2012”and “Rim of the Pacific 2012”are just two of many remarkable examples of America’s success in consolidating diplomatic and military partnerships with regional countries.
Bonnie Glaser argued that PRC’s military buildup has made the region uneasy and led to various efforts to hedge against its rising power by supporting and facilitating the US forward presence for counterbalance; the US assertion that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is vital to its interests have emboldened various players and raised hopes that the US might support their claims against the PRC.[28] This argument reflects the fact that as a result of America’s enhancement of its capabilities in shaping the security environment in the South China Sea, the DOC-symbolized “ASEAN+1” mechanism has been replaced by the US-dominated neo-realist framework. The landscape of international relations in the South China Sea has been transformed in accordance with US strategic intentions.
On account of the existing power gap between the US and PRC, Washington is expected to continue its current hedging strategy—a mixture of engagement and containment—toward the PRC. The hedging strategy first appeared in the 2006 National Security Strategy, which stated that the US “seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.”[29] That is, America encourages the PRC to cooperate with global society and accept international law; at the same time the US is prepared to use military force to deter China’s aggressive behavior.[30] The Obama administration seems to have inherited the strategy. In particular, as the issues of the East and South China Seas continue to heat up, the US needs its hedging strategy more than ever. Amid rising tensions in the seas, increasing joint exercises led by the United States and an expanding number of participants attest to regional support for America’s emerging grand strategy and its continuing hedging strategy.
Consequently, as regional countries seek to advance their own national security and economic interests in the US-dominated neo-realist framework, it can be inferred that “shelving the sovereignty issue for joint development” has become the best policy option for all claimants involved in the disputes of the East and South China Seas.
IV. ROC’s Role in Regional Security Framework
Both US President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton enumerate many Asian countries－including some past foes－as present and future partners. Yet the ROC seems to have been neglected in the big picture of America’s emerging grand strategy of “pivoting toward Asia” or “rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.”
A. The Strategic Values & Role of ROC in the Asia-Pacific
In 2009, As Beijing and Taipei started negotiations over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)－a free-trade agreement across the Taiwan Strait－some believed that it represented an important step toward final unification.[31] In recent years, some American figures have argued that the United States should amend the Taiwan Relations Act, cease arms sales to Taiwan, or even abandon its commitment to helping with the defense of Taiwan.[32] Such views of believing that Taiwan is inevitably moving into Beijing’s orbit, or deeming Taiwan to be an irritant in US-China relations, lead to marginalization of Taiwan in the picture of the new US grand strategy.
However, the adjustment of the US grand strategy implies that US-China maritime cooperation and competition is the main theme of international politics in the 21st century, and that the center stage stretches from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Jim Steinberg, former US deputy secretary of state, argued that the PRC’s choice of role is “the great question of our time;” the peace and prosperity of the world depends on which path it takes.[33] When it comes to the PRC’s choice of role, the importance of the ROC comes to the fore.
John King Fairbank argued in the late 1950s that contemporary Taiwan had become a military and cultural bastion of the United States.[34] The metamorphosis of Taiwan from a Chinese cultural hinterland to a US values-oriented vanguard can be termed strategic symbiosis. The formation of the symbiotic partnership originated from America’s facilitation of ROC’s democracy; nowadays, because of requirements for mutual benefits, the ROC government seeks to help America expand its geostrategic interests. The US-ROC strategic symbiosis consists of proxy balancing and influence operations. Proxy balancing means mutual defense cooperation to balance the PRC. On the diplomatic front, Taipei diligently disperses the seeds of democratic values, which embodies the traditional US values of democracy, freedom and self-determination, to promote regional comprehensive security alliances and help the United States justify the continued domination or expansion of American influence regionally and globally. This is the ROC’s influence operations in peacetime. The ultimate goal of strategic symbiosis could be construed as helping to make China a democratic and free country, or a constructive member of the world community.[35] As the PRC is still groping its way toward regional hegemony and global superpower status, the strategic value of the ROC lies in reminding the PRC of how to be a responsible stakeholder, helping China accept such values as democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, and helping the PRC play a positive and peace-loving role in the international community.
The strategic value of the ROC will be further enhanced if its geostrategic significance is taken into consideration. Nat Bellocchi, former Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), argued that without control of Taiwan, it will be difficult for the PLAN to become a full-fledged “blue water” navy, or for the PRC to exert its influence as a Pacific sea power.[36] Conversely, Nancy Tucker argued that abandonment of Taiwan will lead to doubts in Japan about US reliability, and deal a fatal blow to the US-Japan alliance.[37] The erosion of the integrity of the US-Japan alliance may lead to “re-Asianization of Japan,” which implies a recognition by Tokyo that Japan falls within the PRC’s hegemonic sphere of influence, and accordingly a realignment of its national interests with a more Asia-tinctured identity, which may ultimately cause the collapse of the US-Japan alliance and bring about very severe negative impact upon America’s interests in Asia. Richard Fisher, a leading US expert on the Chinese military, believes that that if the PRC secures control of Taiwan, US leadership in Asia “could evaporate.”[38] Mark Stokes, Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute, argued that the ROC has a pivotal role to play as an ad hoc coalition partner in Air-Sea Battle, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and the strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific, and that “among all potential coalition partners, none is potentially as important as Taiwan.”[39] In this sense, the ROC has ascended to a pivotal position of regional peace and stability.
Apparently, the US-ROC strategic symbiosis is consistent with America’s “hedging strategy” toward the PRC. The ROC can not only exert a “beacon effect” for democratization of China in the general goal of advancing US vales as a whole; it can also help promote regional peace and stability, especially in the East and South China Seas.
B. ROC’s Peace Initiative in the Changing Strategic Environment
Despite the similarities between the policies of Taipei and Beijing regarding the East and South China Seas, the former’s bona fide adherence to a peaceful resolution and the practical approach of “reducing conflict with reconciliation and replacing confrontation with negotiation” make the ROC a great asset in facilitating regional peace and stability for the following reasons.
First of all, Taipei supports the US-Japan security alliance as the cornerstone for East-Asian security, and is willing to make more contributions under the bilateral and multilateral cooperation framework of the US-Japanese alliance.[40] As President Ma stressed, “only a strong US commitment, backed by its credibility in East Asia, can guarantee the peace and stability of this region.”[41]
Secondly, Taipei serves the best model in facilitating peaceful resolution. Since the establishment of the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) in 2000, a CGA police force has replaced the Marine Corps soldiers and taken on the job of safeguarding Taiping island－the biggest island in the South China Sea. This is the very demonstration of goodwill in preventing escalation of conflict and creating room for negotiation, which are good practices for facilitating peaceful resolution.
Thirdly, Taipei can function as a bridge between Beijing and all other claimants on the issue of the East and South China Seas. Since the disputes resumed in recent years, Beijing has proposed that the PRC and ROC make joint efforts to protect common interests in the East and South China Seas. Among all claimants, Taipei is the only party that does not vex Beijing, which benefits the creation of room for negotiation for all.
Fourthly, and last but not least, Taipei has a lot to offer. For instance, comparatively, Taipei has advanced technology for maritime research and development projects. With quality personnel and rich experience, both the CGA and the ROC Navy can make considerable contributions to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in the natural disaster-prone region. The ROC’s Dongsha Island and Taiping Island, respectively situated at the northern entrance and southern entrance to the South China Sea, are both globally renowned for their maritime bio-diversity. While other claimant’s military buildup on their own occupied islets can easily spark conflicts, Taipei’s fortification of the strategically vital Taiping Island only serves to deter any rash moves by other parties, making a direct contribution to regional peace and stability in the crisis-prone area.
V. ROC’s Efforts in Promoting Regional Security Cooperation
A. National Security Strategies: “3 Lines of Defense” & “3 Legs of Security”
The ROC employs a balancing strategy—maintaining cooperation with America, seeking rapprochement with the PRC, staying friendly with Japan—to develop economic relations with China on the one hand, and to enhance military security cooperation with the United States on the other hand; in this way, Taipei can consolidate its values alliance with Washington and use this alliance to support reconciliation and negotiation across the Taiwan Strait, hoping to create a win-win situation among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington.[42] During his videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in May 2011, President Ma committed himself to the building of “three lines of defense” for ROC national security, including:
1. Institutionalizing the Cross-Strait Rapprochement:
The Ma administration champions a “three-nos”policy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force”(不統、不獨、不武) under the ROC Constitution so as to create a “virtuous cycle”for cross-strait relations.
2. Enhancing Taiwan’s Contributions to International Development:
The Ma administration believes that Taiwan’s national security is inseparably tied to the role of “responsible stakeholder” and has adopted a foreign-aid policy in line with international standards and norms in past years; accordingly, humanitarian work especially has become an important platform for Taiwan’s contributions to the international community.
3. Aligning ROC Defense with Diplomacy:
The ROC will resolutely continue to enhance its self-defense capabilities and will continue to build credibility and trust with its closest allies so as to live up to its commitment to being a responsible stakeholder.[43]
In 2012, in his inaugural address, President Ma further asserted that ROC security rests on three legs. The first is the use of cross-strait rapprochement to realize peace in the Taiwan Strait. The second is the use of viable diplomacy to establish more breathing space for Taiwan in the international community. And the third is the use of military strength to deter external threats.[44]
The policy positions of “three lines of defense” and “three legs of national security” are consistent with the core values and the role of the ROC in the big picture of regional security; therefore, Taipei’s policies are instrumental in advancing cross-strait interaction and in winning international support, and are in line with America’s pivoting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the ROC will transform itself into “a peacemaker, a contributor of humanitarian aid, a center for innovation and business opportunities, and a major promoter of cultural exchange.”[45]
B. Approaches: the Peace Initiative & the Principle of Managing Disputes
The ROC adheres to the provisions in the Charter of the United Nations that call for peaceful resolution of international disputes, and has therefore consistently advocated the handling of the Diaoyutais dispute in accordance with the principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development.”[46] Amid rising tensions, noticing that Northeast Asia has become the engine of the world’s economic development and worrying that the region could again succumb to the catastrophe of war, President Ma solemnly proposed on August 5, 2012 an “East China Sea Peace Initiative” in which he called on all parties concerned to:
1. Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions;
2. Shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue;
3. Observe international law and resolve disputes through peaceful means;
4. Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East China Sea;
5. Establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing the resources of the East China Sea.[47]
President Ma indicated that although national sovereignty cannot be compromised, natural resources can be shared; he called on all parties concerned to pursue peace and cooperation in the region together.[48] Despite the fact that the Diaoyutais have always been ROC territory in terms of historical relationships, geographical affiliation, geological extension, utilization of the islands, or international law, Taipei hopes to use the initiative to help build a foundation for negotiation for all claimants, de-escalate regional tensions, fulfill the goal of peaceful resolution, and turn a disputed sea into a sea of peace and cooperation. Moreover, seeking consensus on a “code of conduct in the East China Sea” indicates that the ROC will commit self to the formation of a multilateral international regime.[49] In response, on August 25, the editorial in the Japan Times called on Tokyo to pay serious attention to the Peace Initiative and seek ways to start constructive dialogue with the PRC and ROC to prevent future clashes over the Senkakus and to nurture peaceful ties.[50]
To fulfill this Initiative, Academia Sinica research fellow Professor Yann-huei Song suggests that Taipei take the following measures: academically, Taipei may launch track II dialogues or hold international conferences to invite experts and scholars from the PRC, Japan, and America for the building of consensus; diplomatically, Taipei may call all parties concerned to sign a “Declaration of Conduct in the East China Sea” similar to the DOC in the South China Sea and even push for the negotiation and passage of the Code of Conduct in the East China Sea; commercially, Taipei may facilitate civilian petroleum enterprises in the East China Sea to jointly conduct oil and natural gas surveys and establish organizations for the conservation and governance of fishery stocks.[51] In the end, 錨點錨點Northeast Asia a model of international conflict management.[52] Consequently, the Initiative fulfills not only the use of viable diplomacy but also the role of peacemaker and responsible stakeholder, enhancing ROC contributions to the international community.
In fact, the principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development” applies to both the Diaoyutais and the South China Sea. There are no winners or losers in sovereignty disputes; the fact that Japan and the PRC exercise self-restraint to prevent the escalation of tensions in the dispute over the Diaoyutais indicates that the two governments’ decisions are consistent with the spirit of the East China Sea Peace Initiative. It also indicates that shelving the dispute in favor of joint development would seem to be the best approach to breaking the shackles of nationalism.[53]
Taipei’s Peace Initiative and principle of managing disputes are highly compatible with Washington’s national interests, principle of collaborative diplomatic process, and South China Sea policy. Actually, Taipei’s Peace Initiative and principle could be the best tools to extricate claimants out of the so-called “security dilemma” in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
C. Concrete Measures: Cooperation in Marine Affairs & Maritime Security
The most striking feature of Asia-Pacific geopolitics is that most regional countries are connected to each other by the ocean, which naturally becomes the primary platform for regional cooperation.
(I) Promoting Cooperation in Marine Affairs
Theoretically, diversified Cooperation in Marine Affairs such as maritime education, maritime governance, maritime tourism, oceanic scientific research, sustainable fisheries, and ecology and resource conservation helps promote a benign ambience and advance interconnectedness and interdependence between regional countries. The ROC sincerely recommends that regional countries make the best use of mechanisms—including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (WMPCSCS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)/ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC)—to promote cooperation in marine affairs so as to advance a regional identity that helps overcome contentious nationalism.
(II) Promoting Cooperation in Maritime Security
Because most regional countries are connected to each other by the ocean, strategic security cooperation is almost tantamount to maritime security cooperation. On the one hand, competition for realistic interests between neighboring countries makes the ocean the physical target of conflicts. However, in the era of globalization, the human need for functionalistic integration of “non-controversial” aspects of regional governmental conduct so as to overcome the barriers of sovereignty and prevent the spread of non-traditional security threats renders the ocean a stage for weaving an ever-spreading web of international institutional relationships.[54] That is, maritime non-traditional security cooperation may provide an avenue for the promotion of regional peace and stability.
The 2002 DOC requests concerned states to cooperate in the field of non-traditional security, including marine environmental protection and the fight against transnational crime, including arms trafficking, drug trafficking, and piracy.[55] The simultaneously issued “Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues” (November 2002) announced the use of existing mechanisms to pursue cooperation, and to formulate long-term and mid-term cooperation plans and establish ad hoc working groups to implement plans of action. The subsequent “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues” (January 2004) further specifies objectives of cooperation to include joint efforts against terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and transnational crime and identify areas of cooperation to include information exchange, personnel exchange, law enforcement cooperation, joint research, and other activities.[56] Later, the mechanism of the “ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus Three” (AMMTC+3) is installed; since 2004, five joint statements have been issued by the AMMTC+3.[57] Also installed is the mechanism of the “ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus China” (AMMTC+China); one Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), two Joint Statements, and a Plan of Action for the MOU have been issued by the AMMTC+China since November 2009.[58] The aforementioned documents indicate strong joint commitments to anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, anti-trafficking, anti-smuggling, and anti-transnational crime. Moreover, a large bulk of documents of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) indicate continuous joint efforts by ASEAN and the PRC in non-proliferation, prevention of infectious diseases, disaster management, and environmental pollution control; noticeably, joint efforts in the field of non-traditional security issues have been taken as confidence building measures (CBMs) between ASEAN and the PRC, with specific reference to the South China Sea.[59]
In short, ASEAN and the PRC have repeatedly demonstrated commitment to cooperate across the full spectrum of non-traditional security issues, hoping that these potential CBMs avenues serve to facilitate peace and stability in the South China Sea. With the high-quality personnel of its Navy and Coast Guard Administration, the ROC should be welcomed to join regional efforts dealing with non-traditional security threats.
D. The Past, the Present, and the Future
The existence of APEC, CSCAP, WMPCSCS, ARF, AMM/ASEAN-PMC, ReCAAP, COBSEA, and PEMSEA suggests that claimants are not short of mechanisms or concrete measures for collective functional integration. However, the flaring up of confrontations between claimants and the PRC in the East China Sea and the South China Sea in recent years indicates that political disputes continue to hamper regional cooperation. According to the wisdom of functionalism, the cause of continuing political disputes may well be the failure to overcome the barrier of sovereignty.
Theoretically, the role and efforts of the ROC make Taipei a valuable responsible stakeholder and a significant contributor to peaceful resolution of the disputes in the East and South China Seas. It is a pity that Taipei has been excluded in the past, including the exclusion of the ROC in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Currently, in the 2011 Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, the ROC is again denied its chance to make a contribution to regional peace and stability. A group of scholars from the National Bureau of Asian Research argue that the ROC should be included in dispute resolution discussions as it “can play a part in dispute settlement and cooperative activities for the development of East Asian energy and other natural resources.”[60]
Taipei’s proffering of the East China Sea Peace Initiative and its adherence to the principle of managing disputes have provided the missing link to address the failure to overcome the barrier of sovereignty. In the future, it is highly recommended that in the seeking of Code of Conduct in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the ROC be included in the peacemaking formula so as to turn both seas from disputed waters to seas of friendship, hope, and opportunity.
VI. Conclusion
This paper aims to explore the role and efforts of the ROC in regional maritime security cooperation in the context of America’s pivoting and rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the intensifying competing claims pose the greatest potential threats to regional peace and stability; the increasing maritime non-traditional security threats could cause heavy impact upon the sustainable development of victim countries and bring major turbulence upon regional prosperity. The purpose of maritime security cooperation is to prevent, through collective effort, the damage caused by traditional and non-traditional security threats.
The United States is revamping its Asian strategy to shape the security environment. The US foreign policy is pivoting toward the Asia-Pacific; and the US defense policy is rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. On account of the existing power gap between the United States and PRC, Washington is expected to continue its hedging strategy toward the PRC. As the issues of the East and South China Seas continue to heat up, the increasing joint exercises led by the United States and expanding participants attest to regional support of America’s emerging grand strategy and its continuing hedging strategy.
International maritime cooperation and competition has become the main theme of international politics in the 21st century. As a result, the geopolitical and geostrategic value of the ROC is ascending. The metamorphosis of Taiwan from a Chinese cultural hinterland to a US values-oriented vanguard can be termed strategic symbiosis between the United States and the ROC. The core values of the ROC lie in helping China transform into a peace-loving, constructive member of the international community. Apparently, the US-ROC strategic symbiosis is consistent with America’s “hedging strategy” toward the PRC. ROC functionality has great potential for making a contribution to regional peace and stability.
The “three lines of defense” and the “three legs of national security”—the national security strategy—support the strategic value of the ROC and are in line with America’s renewed Asian strategy. President Ma’s principle of managing disputes and his “East China Sea Peace Initiative” could help build a foundation for negotiations for all claimants, de-escalate regional tensions, fulfill the goal of peaceful resolution, and facilitate a multilateral international regime. Actually, Taipei’s Peace Initiative and principle could be the best approaches to breaking the shackles of rival nationalisms and extricating claimants out of the so-called “security dilemma” in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Despite the existence of commitments of cooperation across the full spectrum of non-traditional security issues, and the mechanisms and measures for collective functional integration, because of failure to overcome the barrier of sovereignty, political disputes continue to hamper regional cooperation. President Ma’s position on the East China Sea Peace Initiative and adherence to the principle of managing disputes has provided the missing link to address the failure and contribute to regional peace and stability.
To serve the strategic value of encouraging China to become a responsible stakeholder and a democratic member of the international community, Taipei will continue to commit itself to the institutionalization of cross-Strait reconciliation by facilitating a virtuous cycle in bilateral relations, to the enhancement of its contribution to the international community by joining regional maritime non-traditional security cooperation and proposing cooperation in marine affairs, and to the alignment of its defense with diplomacy by consolidating its military strength to deter maritime traditional security threats.
Bibliography
ASEAN Secretariat. 2011. "ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus China (AMMTC+China)." ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/24072.htm.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2011. "ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus Three (AMMTC+3)." ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/19506.htm.
ASEAN Secretariat. 1998. "Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures Bandar Seri Begawan, 4-6 November 1997 and Sydney, 4-6 March 1998." ASEAN Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/component/content/article/3-public-library/148-co-chairmens-summary-report-of-the-meetings-of-the-arf-inter-sessional-support-group-on-confidence-building-measures-bandar-seri-begawan-4-6-november-1997-and-sydney-4-6-march-1998-.html.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2004. "Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues." ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/15647.htm.
Bellocchi, Nat. 2010. "Taiwan's Key Role in the South China Sea." Taipei Times, August 11.
Bhatia, Sanjaya, Tiziana Bonapace, P.G. Dhar Chakrabarti, Vishaka Hidallege, Yuichi Ono, and Guoxiang Wu. 2010. "Protecting Development Gains The Asia Pacific Disaster Report 2010." 129. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nationas International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
BP. 2011. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011. London: British Petroleum.
"Brushwood and Gall." 2010. The Economist 397, no. 8711 (Dec 4): [14].
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2012. "Balancing the East, Upgrading the West." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (January): [97-104].
Cha, Ariana Eunjung. 2009. "Taiwan, China Negotiating a Landmark Free-Trade Agreement." The Washington Post, February 21.
Chien, Hsi-chieh (簡錫堦). 2012. "Donghai heping changyi/Chaoye biehu gongji, budang chiangquan qizi (東海和平倡議／朝野別互攻擊 不當強權棋子, East China Sea Initiative/The Ruling Party and the Opposition Should Not Attack Each Other; Taiwan Is Not Board Game Piece)." United Daily News, August 7.
Clinton, Hillary. 2011. "America's Pacific Century." Foreign Policy, no. 189 (November): [56-63].
Debby Guha-Sapir, Femke Vos, Regina Below, and Sylvain Ponserre. 2012. Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011 The Numbers and Trends. Brussels: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).
"Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea." 2002. ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm.
DoD. 2011. "DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon." http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4758.
Editorial. 2012. "Nationalism over the Senkakus." The Japan Times, August 25.
Eurasia Review. 2011. "World Oil Transit Chokepoints." http://www.eurasiareview.com/world-oil-transit-chokepoints-20012011/.
Fisher, Richard D. 2011. "Taiwan in the Lurch." Wall Street Journal, August 19.
Gilley, Bruce. 2010. "Not So Dire Straits How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits US Security." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February): [44-60].
Glaser, Bonnie. 2011. "Tensions Flare in the South China Sea." Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Glaser, Charles L. 2011. "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism." Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April): [80-91].
Goh, Evelyn. 2005. Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies. Washington: East West Center.
Goh, Evelyn. 2006. "Understanding "Hedging" in Asia-Pacific Security." PacNet Newsletter, no. 43, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf.
Goldstein, Joshua S, and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2010. International Relations. 9 ed. New York: Russak & Company.
Grado, Rey Gerilla. 2012. "Different Nationalities Participate in the Pacific Partnership 2012." Leyte Samar Daily Express, http://leytesamardaily.net/2012/06/different-nationalities-participate-in-the-pacific-partnership-2012/.
Gray, Colin. 2006. Force, Order, and Justice: The Ethics of Realism in Statecraft. Edited by Colin Gray and Williamson Murray, Strategy and History. London: Routledge.
Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kane, Paul V. 2011. "To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan." New York Times, November 10.
Ko, Yungkuang (葛永光). 2007. "MeiZhong guanxi: ji hezuo you jingzheng (美中關係：既競爭又合作, US-China Relations: Simultaneous Competition and Cooperation)." Zhanlue anchuan yanxi (戰略安全研析, Strategic and Security Analyses), no. 24 (April): [28-31].
Lin, Wen-lung Laurence. 2006. "The Strategic Symbiosis between US Asian Policy and Taiwanese Nationalism." University of Durham.
Ma, Ying-jeou. 2012. "President Ma's Inaugural Address." Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://www.president.gov.tw/.
Ma, Ying-jeou. 2011. "President Ma's Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies." Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24284&rmid=2355&word1=CSIS&sd=2011/05/01&ed=2011/07/31.
"Maritime Chokepoints Critical to Petroleum Markets." 2011. http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/twip/Mar%202.pdf.
Mitrany, David. 1975. "A Political Theory for the New Society." In Functionalism, edited by A J Groom and Paul Taylor, [25-37]. New York: Crane, Russak & Company.
MND, ed. 2006. Chunghua minguo jiuwunian guofang baogaoshu (中華民國九十五年國防報告書, 2006 National Defense Report). Taipei: Ministry of National Defense.
"Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2011 Press Release." 2011. Maplecroft, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/natural_hazards_2011.html.
Obama, Barrack. 2012. "Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament." White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
Office of Chief of Naval Operations. 2007. "Global Maritime Partnerships ... Thousand Ship Navy." US Navy, http://www.deftechforum.com//ppt/Cotton.ppt.
Office of Commandant of the Marine Corps, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and Office of Commandant of the Coast Guard, eds. 2007. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Washington DC: US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Coast Guard.
Office of Secretary of Defense, ed. 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006. Washington DC: Department of Defense.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, ed. 2010. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010. Washington DC: Department of Defense.
Owens, Bill. 2009. "America Must Start Treating China as a Friend." Financial Times, November 17.
"Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report 1 January－31 December 2010." 2010. edited by ICC International Maritime Bureau, 99. London: International Maritime Organization.
Pollack, Jonathan D. 2006. "US Navy Strategy in Transition: Implications for Maritime Security Cooperation." Paper presented at the 1st Berlin Conference on Asian Security, Berlin, September 14/15.
"President Chen Attends a New Year Party Hosted by the Taiwan Japanese Association and the Taipei Japanese Chamber of Commerce." 2003. Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16625&rmid=2355&word1=Security+alliance.
"President Ma's Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Concept and Strategy of the "Flexible Diplomacy"." 2008. Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=18917&rmid=2355&word1=Security+alliance.
"President Ma Attends Activities Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty." 2012. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=27898&rmid=2355.
Schofield, Clive, Ian Townsend-Gault, Hasjim Djalal, Ian Storey, Meredith Miller, and Tim Cook. 2011. "From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia." 29. Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research.
Secretary of Defense, ed. 2012. Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington DC: Department of Defense.
Sokolsky, Richard, Angel Rabasa, and C. Richard Neu. 2001. The Role of Southeast Asia in US Strategy Toward China. Santa Monica: RAND.
Song, Yann-huei (宋燕輝). 2012. "Donghai heping changyi ruhe luoshi (東海和平倡議 如何落實, How to Fulfill the East China Sea Peace Initiative)." China Times, August 8.
"South China Sea Region." 2003. edited by US Department of Energy, 8: Energy Information Administration.
Stokes, Mark, and Russell Hsiao. 2012. "Why US Military Needs Taiwan." The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/13/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/.
Tsai, Tseng-chia (蔡增家). 2012. "BaoDiao daxi, meishu meiying (保釣大戲 沒輸沒贏, No Winners or Losers in the Show of Safeguarding the Diaoyutais)." China Times, August 18.
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, and Bonnie Glaser. 2011. "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?" The Washington Quarterly 2011, no. Fall: [23-37].
Tzeng, James F. (曾復生). 2011. "Yingdui yatai (應對亞太變局 美國有對策了嗎？, Has the US Got the Strategy to Cope with the Dynamic Situations in the Asia-Pacific Region?)." Guozheng fenxi (國政分析, Analysis on National Policy), no. 國安(析) 100-077號, http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/9884.
White House, ed. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006. Washington DC: White House.
Wu Shicun, and Zou Keyuan. 2009. "Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Cooperation and Implications." http://www.ashgate.com/pdf/SamplePages/Maritime_Security_in_the_South_China_Sea_Ch1.pdf.
＜本文僅供參考，不代表本會立場＞
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, no. 189 (November 2011), 57.
[2] “Security dilemma” means “a situation wherein our overly self-regarding quest for national security translates into peRCEPtions of growing insecurity abroad, and hence, spiral-like, inadvertently to new insecurities for us.” See Colin Gray, Force, Order, and Justice: The Ethics of Realism in Statecraft, ed. Colin Gray and Williamson Murray, Strategy and History (London: Routledge, 2006), 176.
[3] Office of Chief of Naval Operations, "Global Maritime Partnerships ... Thousand Ship Navy," US Navy, http://www.deftechforum.com//ppt/Cotton.ppt (accessed June 14, 2007). Office of Commandant of the Marine Corps, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and Office of Commandant of the Coast Guard, eds., A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington DC: US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Coast Guard, 2007), 4.
[4] Office of Chief of Naval Operations, "Global Maritime Partnerships ... Thousand Ship Navy." Office of Commandant of the Marine Corps, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and Office of Commandant of the Coast Guard, eds., A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 14.
[5] MND, ed., Chunghua minguo jiuwunian guofang baogaoshu (中華民國九十五年國防報告書, 2006 National Defense Report) (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2006), 30. Wu Shicun and Zou Keyuan, "Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Cooperation and Implications," (2009), http://www.ashgate.com/pdf/SamplePages/Maritime_Security_in_the_South_China_Sea_Ch1.pdf (accessed August 1, 2012).
[6] Office of the Secretary of Defense, ed., Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 38.
[7] "South China Sea Region," ed. US Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs (Energy Information Administration, 2003), p. 6.
[8] Office of the Secretary of Defense, ed., Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, 17.
[9] Ibid., 38.
[10] Clive Schofield et al., "From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia," (Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), p. 22.
[11] PLAN doctrine for maritime operations focuses on six offensive and defensive campaigns: blockade, anti-sea lines of communication, maritime-land attack, antiship, maritime transportation protection, and naval base defense; see Office of the Secretary of Defense, ed., Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, 22.
[12] Jonathan D. Pollack, "US Navy Strategy in Transition: Implications for Maritime Security Cooperation" (paper presented at the 1st Berlin Conference on Asian Security, Berlin, September 14/15 2006), 9.
[13] "Maritime Chokepoints Critical to Petroleum Markets," (2011), http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/twip/Mar%202.pdf (accessed 5 Aug 2011. Eurasia Review, "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," http://www.eurasiareview.com/world-oil-transit-chokepoints-20012011/ (accessed Aug 8, 2011). In 2009, total world oil production amounted to approximately 84 mil. bbl/d.
[14] BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011 (London: British Petroleum, 2011), 6, 20. *means more than 100 years.
[15] "South China Sea Region," p. 6.
[16] "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report 1 January－31 December 2010," ed. ICC International Maritime Bureau (London: International Maritime Organization, 2010), pp. 5-6..
[17] Sanjaya Bhatia et al., "Protecting Development Gains The Asia Pacific Disaster Report 2010," (Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nationas International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2010), pp. 1-3.
[18] "Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2011 Press Release," Maplecroft, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/natural_hazards_2011.html (accessed Aug 13, 2011).
[19] Debby Guha-Sapir et al., Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011 The Numbers and Trends (Brussels: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 2012), 1. China, the US, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia are the top 5 countries that are most frequently hit by natural disasters.
[20] Ibid., 2.
[21] Ibid., 29.
[22] Clinton, "America's Pacific Century."
[23] Office of Secretary of Defense, ed., Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 47, 48.
[24] DoD, "DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon," http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4758 (accessed August 14, 2011).
[25] Barrack Obama, "Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament," White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament (accessed November 20, 2011).
[26] Secretary of Defense, ed., Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 2, 4.
[27] Rey Gerilla Grado, "Different Nationalities Participate in the Pacific Partnership 2012," Leyte Samar Daily Express, http://leytesamardaily.net/2012/06/different-nationalities-participate-in-the-pacific-partnership-2012/ (accessed July 17, 2012).
[28] Bonnie Glaser, Tensions Flare in the South China Sea. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011) pp. 5, 7-8, http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_Glaser_South_China_Sea.pdf (accessed November 23, 2011.
[29] White House, ed., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006 (Washington DC: White House, 2006), 42.
[30] Yungkuang (葛永光) Ko, "MeiZhong guanxi: ji hezuo you jingzheng (美中關係：既競爭又合作, US-China Relations: Simultaneous Competition and Cooperation)," Zhanlue anchuan yanxi (戰略安全研析, Strategic and Security Analyses), no. 24 (April 2007), 30. Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, and C. Richard Neu, The Role of Southeast Asia in US Strategy Toward China (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 71-72. Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington: East West Center, 2005), 1-2. Evelyn Goh, "Understanding "Hedging" in Asia-Pacific Security," PacNet Newsletter, no. 43 (2006), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf (accessed September 20, 2010).
[31] Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Taiwan, China Negotiating a Landmark Free-Trade Agreement," The Washington Post, February 21 2009, A09.
[32] Bill Owens, former Vice Chief of Joint Chief of Staff, advocated to stop US arms sales to Taiwan and revise the Taiwan Relations Act, see Bill Owens, "America Must Start Treating China as a Friend," Financial Times, November 17 2009. Charles Glaser argues if the US does not want to get involved in a nuke war with China, “the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan;” Charles L. Glaser, "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April)2011), 87. Bruce Gilley encourages Finlandization of Taiwan; Bruce Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits US Security," Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February)2010). Paul V. Kane, "To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan," New York Times, November 10 2011, A35. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski argued because “it is doubtful that Taiwan could indefinitely avoid a more formal connection with China,” the US should re-examine its support for Taiwan, in particular its arms sales; see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Balancing the East, Upgrading the West," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (January 2012).
[33] "Brushwood and Gall," The Economist 397, no. 8711 (Dec 4 2010), 4-5.
[34] John King Fairbank, "Formosa Through China's Eyes," The New Republic, Vol. 139, No. 15 (1958): 10.
[35] Wen-lung Laurence Lin, "The Strategic Symbiosis between US Asian Policy and Taiwanese Nationalism" (University of Durham, 2006), 224-25.
[36] Nat Bellocchi, "Taiwan's Key Role in the South China Sea," Taipei Times, August 11 2010, 8.
[37] Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?," The Washington Quarterly 2011, no. Fall2011), 32-33.
[38] Richard D. Fisher, "Taiwan in the Lurch," Wall Street Journal, August 19 2011.
[39] Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, "Why US Military Needs Taiwan," The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/13/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/ (accessed.
[40] "President Ma's Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Concept and Strategy of the "Flexible Diplomacy"," Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=18917&rmid=2355&word1=Security+alliance (accessed August 9, 2008). "President Chen Attends a New Year Party Hosted by the Taiwan Japanese Association and the Taipei Japanese Chamber of Commerce," Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16625&rmid=2355&word1=Security+alliance (accessed January 11, 2003).
[41] Ying-jeou Ma, "President Ma's Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24284&rmid=2355&word1=CSIS&sd=2011/05/01&ed=2011/07/31 (accessed May 15, 2011).
[42] James F. (曾復生) Tzeng, "Yingdui yatai (應對亞太變局 美國有對策了嗎？, Has the US Got the Strategy to Cope with the Dynamic Situations in the Asia-Pacific Region?)," Guozheng fenxi (國政分析, Analysis on National Policy), no. 國安(析) 100-077號(2011), http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/9884 (accessed December 17, 2011).
[43] Ma, "President Ma's Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies."
[44] Ying-jeou Ma, "President Ma's Inaugural Address," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://www.president.gov.tw/ (accessed August 18, 2012).
[45] Ma, "President Ma's Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies."
[46] "President Ma Attends Activities Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=27898&rmid=2355 (accessed August 18, 2012).
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Yann-huei (宋燕輝) Song, "Donghai heping changyi ruhe luoshi (東海和平倡議 如何落實, How to Fulfill the East China Sea Peace Initiative)," China Times, August 8 2012, A18.
[50] Editorial, "Nationalism over the Senkakus," The Japan Times, August 25 2012.
[51] Song, "Donghai heping changyi ruhe luoshi (東海和平倡議 如何落實, How to Fulfill the East China Sea Peace Initiative)," A18.
[52] Hsi-chieh (簡錫堦) Chien, "Donghai heping changyi/Chaoye biehu gongji, budang chiangquan qizi (東海和平倡議／朝野別互攻擊 不當強權棋子, East China Sea Initiative/The Ruling Party and the Opposition Should Not Attack Each Other; Taiwan Is Not Board Game Piece)," United Daily News, August 7 2012, A19.
[53] Tseng-chia (蔡增家) Tsai, "BaoDiao daxi, meishu meiying (保釣大戲 沒輸沒贏, No Winners or Losers in the Show of Safeguarding the Diaoyutais)," China Times, August 18 2012, A17.
[54] Functionalists stress to highlight technical and “non-controversial” aspects of governmental conduct and clamor for weaving an ever-spreading web of international institutional relationships on the basis of meeting human needs and desires. They may concentrate on commonly experienced needs initially; later they expect the circle of the non-controversial to expand as practical cooperation become conterminous with the totality of interstate relations. The technological and economic development of human being lead the international community to “not to create sovereignty but to deny it” (emphasis by the authors of this paper) for collective functional integrations, so as to satisfy basic common needs and create public welfare; therefore, countries should work together to solve widespread social and economic problems and promote common interests. See Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 6. See also David Mitrany, "A Political Theory for the New Society," in Functionalism, ed. A J Groom and Paul Taylor (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975), 30, 32. Joshua S Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 9 ed. (New York: Russak & Company, 2010), 355.
[55] "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed.
[56] ASEAN Secretariat, "Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues," ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/15647.htm (accessed July 31, 2012).
[57] ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus Three (AMMTC+3)," ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/19506.htm (accessed August 2, 2012).
[58] ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus China (AMMTC+China)," ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/24072.htm (accessed August 2, 2012).
[59] For example, see ASEAN Secretariat, "Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures Bandar Seri Begawan, 4-6 November 1997 and Sydney, 4-6 March 1998," ASEAN Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/component/content/article/3-public-library/148-co-chairmens-summary-report-of-the-meetings-of-the-arf-inter-sessional-support-group-on-confidence-building-measures-bandar-seri-begawan-4-6-november-1997-and-sydney-4-6-march-1998-.html (accessed August 2, 2012).
[60] Schofield et al., "From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity," p. 26.
The ROC in Maritime Security Cooperation
作者曾復生
發布日期